The objectives of the European Union (EU) public procurement law are generous in terms of opening public procurement market. The effective functioning of this market seems to facilitate the access of good-, service-, and work providers from developed EU countries on the markets of less developed EU member states. This paper aims at highlighting factual issues in favor of this supposition.
2

Daniela Pîrvu and Cristina Bâldan
effectively finish the eventual contract, but it will not put hard or excessive conditions to scare away possible bidders.
According to a European Commission staff working paper, European suppliers are reticent about participating in cross-border tenders. In other words, linguistic, legal, and administrative barriers as well as continued practices of local preference serve as a restraint on cross-border participation (European Commission 2011a) . In Romania, the number of foreign economic operators that execute works and provide services and goods, following public procurement procedures, is much greater than the number of Romanian economic operators doing the same job. This status quo in Romania, especially pertaining to cross-border public procurements, begs the question as to whether or not this situation is common for other less developed EU states. The primary objective of this study is to emphasize the differences in terms of the economic operators' access to the EU public procurement market depending on their country of origin. In this paper, we also try to respond to another question: Are there influences on the foreign economic operators' access to national public procurement markets, depending on the type or objective of the public contract? Our research is based on analysis of a representative number of contract-award notices published in the database of EU's Tenders Electronic Daily (TED).
As a secondary goal, the paper attempts to reveal that the cross-border public procurement has a lower share of the total EU public procurement market. Thus, the result of the EU public procurement reform is not yet visible. The results we obtain point to a reality that has not as yet been highlighted by the studies of the European Commission: Namely, that the functioning of the EU public procurement market generates both "winners" and "losers" among EU member states.
Liberalization of the EU Public Procurement Market
According to some authors, the liberalization of the public procurement market in the EU was an important reform because the optimal functioning of the common market has been largely dependent on it. Thus, the liberalization of the public procurement market in the EU is expected to generate benefits, such as reduction of trade costs in influencing the economic landscape (Trionfetti 2001) , securing market transparency (Ulff-Moller Nielsen and Gottlieb Hansen 2001) , and intensifying competition within the common market (Uttley and Hartley 1994) . Federico Trionfetti (2001) welcomes the liberalization of the public procurement market because it increases the efficiency of production in government output. Jørgen UlffMoller Nielsen and Lars Gottlieb Hansen (2001) show that the European Commission's efforts to coordinate the procedures for awarding public procurement contracts during 1989-1999 produced an increasing cross-border commerce, largely as a consequence of a public procurement market transparency. This transparency should further improve after the complete liberalization of the EU public procurement market.
M.R.H. Uttley and Keith Hartley (1994) demonstrate that the public authorities from countries that lack liberalized public procurement markets paid much higher prices for needed goods, because there were no incentives for local suppliers to invest in new technologies. Mitchell Smith (2005) as well as Antonio Estache and Atsushi Iimi (2008) reach similar conclusions regarding the cost savings in public procurements under the public procurement market liberalization. Currently, public procurement policy in the EU is an instrument for innovation (Edler et al. 2005; Edler and Georghiou 2007; Hommen and Rolfstam 2009; Nyiri et al. 2007; Uyarra and Flanagan 2010) because many of the public investment projects in EU member states target the development of environmentally friendly products and new energy technologies. Thus, one might say that public procurement involves innovation. Public procurement is also an important instrument for improving the accessibility of information (Corvers et al. 2009 ), because the relevant European Union law facilitates the public procurement of accessible information and communication technologies (ICT) products and services.
In order to liberalize the public procurement market in the EU, European institutions have acted on several fronts. First, they introduced a main objective of European public procurement law to open the national public procurement markets of the member states to each other's industries, contractors, and service providers. Second, they adopted a public procurement law in the EU (public procurement directives). Third, they created two e-procurement portals: Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) and Information System for European Public Procurement (SIMAP). TED provides interested users with access to all public tenders that are published EU-wide. SIMAP offers background information, links, and standard public procurement forms.
The European regulatory framework provides all economic operators with the opportunity to submit bids and participate in the EU public procurement. Public procurement directives apply to the award of (public) works contracts, (public) supplies contracts, and (public) service contracts. Their estimated value -net of value added tax (VAT) -is at least equal to the following thresholds (Commission Regulation no 1177/2009): (a) 4,845,000 euro for works contracts, including subsidized works contracts; and (b) 125,000-387,000 euro for supplies and services contracts, depending the body awarding the contract and the type of services involved.
Public procurement directives aim at ensuring that economic operators benefit fully from the basic freedoms in the field of public procurement. Public procurement directives focus mainly on the following three factors: (i) wide publicity for ensuring that all economic operators have the opportunity to compete for public contracts from and within EU member states; (ii) banning technical specifications liable to discriminate against potential foreign bidders; and (iii) application of clear and objective criteria in selecting tenderers and awarding contracts.
The directives also mention other objectives such as increasing efficiency of public spending, protection of the environment and social standards, and fight against corruption (European Commission 2011b). The issue of public procurement directives was debated at length, especially in terms of national legislation of member states' compliance with European legislation (Bianchi and Guidi 2010; Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman 2006; OECD 2010) , measuring benefits arising from public procurement directives (Europe Economics 2011; Vogel 2009) , and the need to improve them (Europe Economics 2004; Oosterhuis et al. 2003; Strand, Ramada and Canton 2011) .
Member states have incorporated EU public procurement directives into their national law, although the latter still preserve many original features. Accordingly, national laws must not restrict economic operators' participation in competition for public contracts. Most of the public procurement notices are sent for publication through an electronic channel, national electronic public procurement systems, and TED. The TED is mandatory when the estimated value of the contract (net of VAT) equals or exceeds a certain pecuniary threshold. Many contracting authorities prefer public procurement notices published both through national electronic public procurement systems and through TED in order to increase the pool of potential bidders.
The EU public procurement market presents some quantitative characteristics which we have captured by analyzing data regarding public contracts awarded following publication of a procurement notice in TED between 2007 and 2011. This period is representative since Romania and Bulgaria (countries included in the latest wave of EU enlargement) joined the European Union on January 1, 2007.
The first observation on the EU public procurement market ( Figure 1 ) during the period analyzed refers to the increasing number of public contracts awarded following the publication of a procurement notice in TED. 
Access to the EU Public Procurement Market
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The largest increase was recorded for service contracts, constituting half of the total public contracts awarded in member states. The public procurement-market structure is not the same in all member states ( Figure 2 ). The share of public works contracts as a total number is high in Austria and Germany (over 47 percent). In Malta and Cyprus, the share of public supply contracts as a total number is even higher (about 70 percent). The Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom also have a large total share of public service contracts (about 60 percent). The number of public contracts awarded, following publication of a procurement notice in TED, varies widely from member state to member state in the European Union. 
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The growth of the EU public procurement market may also be demonstrated by the changing value of public procurement as a percentage of the GDP (Table 1) . The average value of public procurement as a percentage of the GDP increased from 3.0 to 3.7 percent across the EU between 2007 and 2011. Most member countries registered increases in value of public procurement as a percentage of the GDP (in the case of Slovakia, this increase was spectacular). The value of public procurement as a percentage of the GDP is higher among new member states, including Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria. This is so, because public authorities in these countries have contracted numerous works, goods, and services with resources available from the structural and cohesion funds in recent years. (These funds are part of the EU structural policy, which aims to bridge the gap of development levels between different regions and countries of the European Union, and to promote economic and social cohesion.) 
Methodology
In the first stage of this research we created a sample of observations based on contract award notices published in TED in the period between 2007 and 2011. The size of the sample (Table 2) we determined using Taro Yamane's equation (1967, 886) :
where S is the size of the sample, N is the total contract award notices published in the TED, and e is the acceptable error limit (level of precision) (1.4 percent).
We determined the size of the sample for each year and the type of contract based on the share held by: (a) public contracts awarded in a given year and (b) certain types of public contracts within all public contracts awarded following publication of a procurement notice in TED (see Figure 1) . Our sample is disproportionate considering the factors that influenced the number of contracts awarded following publication of a procurement notice in TED. We tested the relationship between the number of contracts awarded, population, GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS), and value of public procurement as a percentage of the GDP for each member state.
We determined the number of annual observations (public contracts awarded following publication of a procurement notice in TED) for each member state using the following formulas, We distributed the 24 observations as follows: three observations for work contracts, nine observations for supply contracts, and twelve observations for service contracts. This is based on the case of Belgium in 2007, when there were 462 public works contracts awarded, 1,302 public supply contracts awarded, and 1,845 public services contract awarded.
The selection of contracts awarded, following publication of a procurement notice in TED (in order to gather information), was done by establishing a step sample k. k is the ratio of total contracts awarded following publication of a procurement notice in TED in the case of a member state (population size) and the number of observations determined by the method described above (sample size). This information refers to the residence of the contracting authority, the type and origin of economic operator to whom the contract has been awarded, and the contract value. The study results include potential errors that might be caused by imperfections of the TED. Thus, in about five percent of the cases, the application of the step sample did not allow gathering of the necessary information because the contract award notices were incomplete. In this case, the step was given a value of k+1. The public contracts awarded in non-euro-currency EU countries we converted into euro, based on the annual average exchange rates calculated by the European Central Bank.
Results
We intended to achieve two objectives by processing data for the sample. The first was to find some differences in terms of economic operators' access to the EU public procurement market depending on their origin (Table 4 ). The second was to help expand the knowledge of the EU public procurement market in terms of the type of public contracts awarded and structure of cross-border public procurements compared to studies provided by the European Commission. The 27 EU member states were divided into two categories based on GDP per capita in PPS: (a) developed countries (with index of a country higher than 100): Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and (b) less developed countries: Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Cyprus, and Greece.
Several important observations result from analyzing Table 4 . First, the number of public contracts awarded to foreign economic operators (member and non-member states) represents 5.2 percent of the total public contracts in the sample. The value of public contracts awarded to foreign economic operators (member and non-member states) represents 5.5 percent of the total public contracts in the sample. A European Commission study, "Cross-Border Procurement Above EU Thresholds" (Sylvest at al. 2011) , for the period from 2007 to 2009, has identified a share of 1.6 percent crossborder public procurement above EU thresholds as a number of awards, and a share of 3.6 percent direct cross-border public procurement above EU thresholds as contract values. Taking into account that our sample is based only on contract-award notices published in TED for works, goods, and services, we consider our results to be realistic. Second, the cross-border public procurements are more common in public supply contracts (6.5 percent of the public supply contracts in the sample). This situation is explained by the lower barriers to cross-border public procurement (i.e., supply contracts do not require the moving of assets and personnel as works and services contracts do; also, there is less need to communicate with beneficiaries, thus eliminating language barriers). Third, the number of public contracts awarded to foreign economic operators (from non-member states) represents 0. total public contracts in the sample. The low participation of economic operators from non-member states in the EU public procurement market is generated by the difficulty of fulfilling the quality standards stipulated in the Public Procurement Directives, specific to the European community. Fourth, in most cases of cross-border public procurement, contracting authorities in developed EU countries award public contracts to economic operators from other developed EU countries. As Figure 3 shows, the involvement of economic operators from smaller EU countries like Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, and Portugal, in crossborder public procurement is very low. The cross-border public procurement market is dominated by large and developed EU countries like Germany, the UK, France, and Italy. However, the small states that benefit from location advantages hold an important position in this market, too. For example, economic operators from Greece are frequent suppliers of works, goods, and services for contracting authorities in Malta and Cyprus. Considering our sample, our research contributes to deepening the EU public procurement market analysis by showing the structure of public contracts (Table 5) . In this light, we grouped the public contracts under study here in several categories based on their objectives. For each category of public contract, we measure the level of foreign economic operators' access to the EU public procurement market. To do so, we used a simple scale of measurement. We establish the ratings regarding the public procurement market opening according to the share of contracts awarded to foreign economic operators in all public contracts grouped by objectives (or object). The access of foreign economic operators to the EU public procurement market in the supply of food, energy products, paper and printing products, cleaning services, security services, and advertising is very small. On the other hand, the foreign operators' access to the EU public procurement market is very high in the purchases of goods pertaining to the construction industry, metrology, the military, and ICT. The share of this latter category of public contracts from the total of public contracts in the sample is small: 6.5 percent as a number and 1.1 percent as a value. The ratings "small" and "very small" characterize most of the public procurement market (sample), both in terms of number and value.
Our sample data processing (covering the period from 2007 to 2011) showed that there is a difference of 2.4 percent (equal to 1,670,676,813 euro) between the estimated and the final value of the public contracts awarded, constituting the savings that have resulted from public procurement processes. In terms of number and value, the public service contracts have the highest share of the total public contracts. A significant gap between the number of contracts (small) and the value of contracts (high) exists in the spheres of financial intermediation (insurance contracts, bank credit agreements, etc.) and transport infrastructure. Contracts for health products and medical equipment constitute the highest share of public supply contracts.
Conclusions
The EU public procurement market is large. The legislative and information framework exists to ensure that this market opens even more. Cross-border public procurements have only a small weight (number and value) in the total EU public procurements. Our analysis of the EU public procurement market pertaining to the access of foreign economic operators to contracts awarded in EU member states generated the following conclusions. First, the frequency of cross-border public procurement was highest for public supply contracts. Second, the participation of economic operators from non-member states in the EU public procurement market is very low. Third, the most common situation of cross-border public procurement is the awarding of public contracts in developed EU countries to economic operators from other developed EU countries. Four, it is more common for less developed EU countries to award public contracts to economic operators from developed EU countries than to economic operators from other less developed EU countries. Fifth, large and developed EU countries like Germany, the UK, France, and Italy, dominate the cross-border public procurements in the European Union. Sixth, the access of foreign economic operators to certain categories of public contracts (such as execution, design, or carrying of construction works) awarded in member states is very small. While the European Commission has shown interest in finding the causes for this low access of foreign economic operators to the EU public procurement market, it is yet to report on its findings. Our study hereby unequivocally establishes the existence of access discrepancies. Therefore, the main direction of a future research should be to identify the causes that are responsible for limiting the access of economic operators from less developed EU countries to contracts awarded EU-wide. Meanwhile, the European legislation on public procurement could be improved to facilitate both increased cross-border public procurement and greater participation of economic operators from less developed EU countries in the European Union public procurement market.
An initial set of measures should generate increasing participation notices in TED. Thus, threshold limit values should be modified toward reduction. The division in lots would not be allowed for public contracts whose objectives include the same common procurement vocabulary (CPV). Public contracting authorities would be forced, therefore, to publish more participation notices in TED. Chances of economic operators from a member state to perform work and provide goods and services in other EU countries will also increase.
Another set of measures should generate changing conditions of participation and qualification for economic operators. Introducing a European procurement passport -a document that would replace the contract-qualifying documents at present, such as certificates of registration, evidence of qualifying experience, and others -would be cost-and time-saving. As a result, economic operators would be stimulated to participate in more competitions for public contracts.
Currently, requirements regarding the minimum overall turnover and the value of similar executed contracts (requirements different from one public contract to another) may disadvantage economic operators from smaller or less developed EU countries that compete with economic operators from other EU countries. The European public procurement legislation should make reference to the turnover in each field of activity. This is a more telling indicator of the economic operator's ability to execute a public contract within the technical and economic performance parameters required by the contracting authorities. This experience should not register as a value, but merely as an observation.
Ultimately, our results should serve as a warning about certain deficiencies in the EU public procurement market which affect the proper functioning of the single market. Politicians representing the interests of individual member states should understand that the unequal participation of economic operators from less developed EU countries impedes the efforts to stimulate competition within the single market. Such competitive advantages offered by the less developed EU countries as cheaper labor and lower prices of some goods and services are being wasted on the single market due to this participatory inadequacy.
The natural tendency of public authorities is to award public contracts to local economic operators must be overcome so that the general interest of the EU may take precedence. The equal access to the EU public procurement market, irrespective of economic operators' origin, is crucial for reducing the development gap between the members of the European Union.
Notes
1.
The weighting factor in equation (3) and (4) was found by regressing the number of contracts awarded (CAi) following publication of a procurement notice against population (POPi) for a sample of 27 member states over five years (n=135). The coefficient of determination (R 
2. "Public works contracts" are public contracts having as their objective either the execution, or both the design and execution, of works related to one of the activities within the meaning of Annex I or a work, or the realization, by whatever means, of a work corresponding to the requirements specified by the contracting authority. A "work" means the outcome of building or civil engineering works taken as a whole which is sufficient of itself to fulfill an economic or technical function. "Public supply contracts" are public contracts having as their objective the purchase, lease, rent, or hire purchase, with or without option to buy, of products. "Public service contracts" are public contracts other than public works or supply contracts having as their objective the provision of services.
